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AFTER THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
INTRODUCTION BY WHITMAN H. RIDGWAY*
The creation of an independent Executive in article II of the
Constitution' troubled some of the founding fathers. Fearful of the
abuses associated with monarchies, they sought to curb the Presi-
dent's independence through a system of checks and balances that
divided power between the executive and legislative branches, while
giving the President veto power over legislation. The Constitution
gave the President control over the executive branch of govern-
ment2 without specifying what the President's role would be in do-
mestic affairs of the Nation; made the President Commander-in-
Chief of the Nation's military' at a time when there was only a small
force; and gave the President substantial control over foreign affairs
subject only to the Senate's right to ratify treaties and Congress'
right to allocate money and to declare war.4
Over the past two hundred years the power and influence of the
Presidency has expanded enormously. Active presidents who be-
lieved that they embodied the will of the people, from Andrew Jack-
son to Ronald Reagan, have pressed reluctant Congresses to
approve legislation they personally desired. The authority of the
executive branch in domestic affairs has grown substantially since
the New Deal era. The power of the Presidency has expanded with
every war the Nation has fought and Presidents have jealously
guarded their prerogatives in foreign affairs. Theodore Roosevelt
insisted that the Nation needed the Panama Canal, Woodrow Wil-
son wanted the League of Nations, and Ronald Reagan sought sup-
port for the Contras in Nicaragua.
Notwithstanding the broad Presidential powers of article II,
Congress has frequently asserted its equality under the separation
of powers doctrine. The War Powers Resolution,5 passed in the
wake of the Vietnam War, was designed to reassert congressional
* Associate Professor of History, University of Maryland College Park.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2. Id. at § 2.
3. Id. at cl. 1.
4. Id. at cl. 2; see also id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, 18.
5. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(Supp. III 1985)).
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power in foreign policy decisionmaking. Opponents of this legisla-
tion argue that it is inherently unconstitutional.
There are two contemporary events that formed a background
to Professor Schlesinger's lecture. The Nation was captivated by the
Iran-Contra hearings. The hearings probed executive branch deci-
sionmaking concerning the sale of weapons to Iran and the diver-
sion of some of these funds to purchase arms for the Contras in the
face of congressional legislation6 forbidding such assistance by the
government. There was also a debate on national policy toward the
Sandanista government of Nicaragua and the wisdom of supporting
the Contra effort to subvert it through armed conflict.
Against this timely backdrop, Professor Schlesinger examines
the current debate concerning the appropriate scope of Presidential
power in our democracy. He defends the balance of powers struck
by the framers against those who believe that the Constitution un-
duly hampers Executive policymaking, especially in the area of na-
tional security. He acknowledges that the separation of powers
doctrine can prove somewhat disabling for a President, but believes
that effective Presidential leadership can overcome these problems
by urging Congress and the Nation to consensus. And, by requiring
the President to achieve this consensus, the separation of powers
principle ensures the accountability fundamental to our constitu-
tional system.
6. Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982) (Boland Amendment).
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